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UNCERTAINTY, POLITICS, AND OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DEVELOPMENT
Robert B. Wiygul
Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS") oil
and gas drilling has been a controversial
subject ever since the Santa Barbara Oil spill
of January, 1969. In the past decade, the
Reagan Administration's plans to open to
exploration additional areas of the OCS on
the East and West Coasts have been met
with Congressional action denying the
Department of the Interior the funds
necessary to carry out proposed lease sales,
and in the last Congressional session
legislation was introduced to place a
permanent moratorium on oil and gas leasing
on most of the OCS. In general, the federal
government's program to develop the OCS is
in trouble everywhere outside the Western
Gulf of Mexico, an area that has traditionally
welcomed oil and gas development. The
Bush Administration has acknowledged this,
and promised some reforms, including greater
attention to environmental concerns, in its
soon to be released OCS leasing program.
The political maneuverings that have
shut down a good deal of OCS leasing in the
past decade are symptomatic of a general
perception that the federal government is
prepared to go ahead with OCS development
at the expense of environmental concerns,
and specifically at the expense of the coastal
states, which will bear much of the impact of
that development. This has placed the
coastal states outside the Western Gulf of
Mexico in something of an institutional role
of opposing OCS development, or at least
insisting upon greater safeguards than the
Minerals Management Service (MMS), the
branch of the Department of the Interior
that handles OCS development, would
require. One useful way to look at this
conflict between the coastal states and the
federal government is to say the coastal states
are prepared to accept less uncertainty about
the effects of OCS development than is the
MMS.
The quality and quantity of
environmental information used in the federal
offshore leasing program has been the target
of criticism from several sources other than
the coastal states or green advocacy groups.
A committee of the National Research
Council, charged to evaluate the adequacy of
environmental information for making leasing
decisions in three areas offshore California
and southern Florida, recently released a
report finding inadequacies in the information
available for each of the areas. Equally
important, the committee expressed a number
of more far-reaching criticisms of the OCS
leasing program. (NRC 1989). A joint
federal-state task force evaluating the
propriety of scheduled OCS leasing off the
coasts of Washington and Oregon has also
recommended that leasing be delayed until
additional environmental studies arc
completed. Finally, in late June 1990, the
Bush Administration announced a decision
that scheduled leasing of OCS areas off
California, Florida and New England would
be delayed until further environmental studies
could be performed.
All of this points to something amiss
in the way the United States has gone about
developing its Outer Continental Shelf
resources. A system that has left some of
the coastal states frustrated enough to resort
to policy-making through the unwieldy device
of Congressional budget moratoria is rather
clearly a system with a problem. Likewise, a
system prepared to schedule and undertake
leasing and development without adequate
scientific information on their impacts also
has a problem. The OCS contains a lot of
oil and gas, and recent events in the Persian
Guld underscore the importance of
developing that resource, if it can be done
safely. The purpose of this paper is to see
how these two ideas-input by the coastal
states and scientific uncertainty-interact at
some critical points in the OCS leasing and
development process, and how that
interaction has helped to cause the present
problems.
The approach I will take is to briefly
review the sorts of environmental impacts
that OCS drilling can have, with an emphasis
on what we don't know about the
consequences of these impacts. Since I am
a lawyer and not a scientist, this will
necessarily be a fairly superficial review, and
will stick to propositions on which there
seems to be general agreement. I will then
take a look at the way the regulatory system
treats this uncertainty about environmental
effects of OCS drilling in some specific
statutes, regulations, and in judicial review of
OCS development decisions, and the
implications that this treatment has for state
input into OCS decisions.
The conclusion that I reach~and I
hope the conclusion that the reader will
reach-is that given the present state of
knowledge about the effects of OCS oil and
gas development and the present regulations,
it will be an extremely rare case in which
OCS development will be stopped by the
federal government, or can be stopped by the
coastal states, out of environmental concerns
without resort to political measures. This
means that which might be called the "burden
of uncertainty" is on the coastal states in their
institutional role of opposing OCS
development. This conclusion has several
implications for the system which I will
discuss in the conclusion.
Environmental Impacts of OCS Development
and Uncertainty
Let's begin with a few basics.
OCS oil and gas wells are drilled from
one of several different sorts of installations,
including fixed platforms, so-called "jack-up"
rigs, or anchored drilling vessels. Drilling is
a big operation, requiring a large number of
support personnel and significant onshore
support facilities. If oil or gas is discovered,
then additional wells are drilled, and fixed
platforms to hold production facilities are
installed. In addition, the oil or gas must be
transported to shore either by pipeline or by
vessel. Unless the production is transported
elsewhere by vessel, onshore transmission and
possibly processing facilities must be
constructed.
These activities cover a lot of ground,
and the kinds of environmental effects they
can cause are equally wide-ranging. Many arc
rather obvious and can be predicted with
some certainly. Rig emplacement can cause
physical impacts on bottom-dwelling biological
communities. Pipelines must cross often-
fragile coastal zone areas. Support facilities
take up space that may be at a premium in
coastal areas.
Other environmental effects are less
obvious and less certain. The cumulative
effects of construction of gravel causeways
for placement of pipelines, for example, arc
not known. Animals may adapt to the noise
and human presence associated with drilling
operations, or those factors may significantly
disturb their behavior patterns. (MMS 1988).
Drilling an oil and gas well produces
a number of different sorts of effluents, often
in large quantities. These include drill
cuttings, which are the ground up material
produced by the bit as a well is drilled, and
drilling fluids, which arc used to lubricate and
cool the drilling pipe and bring drill cuttings
back to the surface. The ingredients of
drilling fluids are generally fairly innocuous,
but they may on occasion contain toxic
additives. In addition, if large amounts of
these cuttings or drilling fluids are discharged
directly into the ocean, as they often are in
OCS drilling, they may bury nearby bottom-
dwelling organisms, and may affect other
factors, such as light penetration, for a
considerable distance around the platform.
The available studies do not indicate any
long-term harmful environmental effects from
the discharge of the sorts of drilling fluids
routinely used in OCS operations, but
definitive studies of areas in the Gulf of
Mexico that have experienced heavy OCS
development have not been performed.
(NRC 1989, NRC 1983).
Other sorts of pollutants produced by
OCS drilling include sanitary waste,
miscellaneous sorts of materials used in
servicing or operating machinery, and solid
waste such as lost tools or pipe. The engines
necessary to run the drilling rig may produce
significant amounts of airborne pollutants.
None of these are produced in the same
volume as drilling fluids and cuttings, but they
do have potential environmental effects.
OCS drilling activities also have the
potential to disrupt the life cycles of various
inhabitants of the OCS. This can occur
simply through the presence of installations
on the OCS, for example if they are placed
adjacent to spawning areas, or through the
conduct of operations, as when vessel traffic
crosses whale migration routes. These
potential effects can be of particular
importance when they involve one of the
several endangered species that inhabit the
OCS.
Production of oil and gas involves
additional potential environmental hazards.
Oil and gas is often found in association with
various amounts of water, which must be
separated from the hydrocarbons at some
point. This produced water can contain a
number of pollutants, including hydrocarbons
and various sorts of heavy metals. Definitive
studies on the long-term effects of produced
waters on the marine environment have not
been performed. (MMS 1988).
Finally, actual production and
transportation of OCS oil brings about the
possibility of oil spills, which are the real
hobgoblin of OCS development. They are
not predictable, they are ugly, and their
consequences for wildlife and scenery can be
devastating. Oil spills differ from other sorts
of OCS pollution in that they are unexpected
events. Over the life of any OCS project,
however, it is statistically certain that small oil
spills will occur. In addition, an OCS
development project of any size brings with it
the risk that larger spills will occur. As is the
case with drilling discharges and produced
waters, the available literature indicates no
real environmental harm from small
discharges of oil, but the long-term effects of
such discharges are not known with certainty.
In addition, many of the long-term effects of
larger spills are not completely understood.
Finally, it is generally agreed that the
available technology for spill containment is
incapable of completely containing a spill in
unfavorable weather conditions. This means,
in essence, that no matter what precautions
are taken, there will be some danger of
damage to the environment if a spill occurs.
(MMS 1989, NRC 1985).
The point of all this is not to give a
definitive review of the scientific information
on the environmental impacts of OCS drilling,
but simply to show that in all of these areas
there is anywhere from a little bit to a great
deal of uncertainty. Some of that uncertainty
is unavoidable. In the case of oil spills, their
size and occurrence cannot be predicted with
any certainty, and their effects are largely
dependent on conditions at the time of their
occurrence. It is difficult to predict the
consequences of many other sorts of impacts
because ecological relationships on the OCS
are extremely complex and not well
understood. In some cases research is
difficult, in others the necessary research
simply has not been performed. In some
cases there is disagreement about the value
of the work that has been performed.
The National Research Council
committee had several basic concerns about
the available ecological data that are relevant
here. The committee's study was directed
toward specific areas of California and
Florida, but these concerns have general
application to OCS development. First, there
has been little focus on regional ecosystem
process studies, or how the elements making
up an ecosystem work together. This kind of
knowledge is necessary to help predict the
impacts of OCS activities. Second, the risk
analysis used in making OCS decisions has
tended to focus on the possibility of oil spills,
and gives less attention to other potential
effects of OCS activities. In addition,
sublethal and chronic impacts of OCS
activities are often given short shrift. The
committee stated that the MMS should have
performed studies in established fields off
Southern California or in the Gulf of Mexico
to determine these sorts of effects.
Another point the National Research
Council committee makes that is important
for our analysis is that more detailed, site-
specific environmental information is
necessary for decisions on development and
production than for decisions on leasing. The
committee expressed concern, however, that
it could not verify that there was a distinction
between the decision to lease an area and
the decision to permit oil and gas
development and production in the area if
hydrocarbons were found. This appeared to
be the case because by the time leasing and
exploration had taken place, millions of
dollars had been expended on the prospect,
and consequently a decision not to develop
is not a realistic possibility. In support of
this idea, the committee pointed out that the
Department of the Interior has never used
the procedures the Outer Continental Lands
Act (OCSLA) provides for cancelling a lease,
nor has it ever refused to approve a plan
submitted under the OCSLA for development
of a proven area on the OCS. The same
conclusions were echoed in a recent article by
John Van de Kamp, Attorney General of the
state of California, in the winter 1990 edition
of the Harvard Environmental Law Journal.
The National Research Council
committee also expressed concern that the
OCS-related environmental studies that had
been performed seemed to be concentrated
in areas in which opposition to OCS leasing
was vociferous, perhaps at the expense of
areas no less deserving of protection and
study but less vocal. A quick look at the
historical expenditure of funds in the
Minerals Management Service's Outer
Continental Shelf Environmental Studies
Program seems, at least superficially, to
support this conclusion: although
approximately ninety percent of OCS leasing
and development has occurred in the Gulf of
Mexico OCS region, only fifteen to twenty
percent of environmental expenditures have
occurred there. (MMS 1988). The Gulf of
Mexico region has, of course, historically been
receptive to offshore development, while
other areas of the country have been less so.
The Structure of the Leasing and
Development Process
With that background, let's talk for a
bit about the OCS leasing and development
process. Beginning in 1978, when Congress
extensively amended the OCSLA, the OCS
leasing and development process has had four
stages: pre-leasing, leasing, exploration, and
development and production. The basic idea
behind putting this structure in place was to
guide the Secretary of the Interior in making
leasing and development decisions, ensure
that environmental factors were taken into
account, and cut down on the litigation that
had plagued the leasing process since the
1969 Santa Barbara oil spill. To accomplish
this, the tiered approach was intended to
require more specific environmental
information about an OCS area as more
specific and intrusive activities were planned.
As a part of the OCSLA overhaul, the states
were also given opportunities for input at
each of these stages.
In the latter two phases, exploration
and development/production, state input
comes both through the OCSLA and the
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).
The CZMA permits a state having an
approved coastal zone management program
to review federally permitted activities for
consistency with that program. In the 1978
amendments to the OCSLA, this "consistency
review" power was extended to plans covering
OCS exploration and development (although
not, as the Supreme Court held in Secretaiy
of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312
(1984), to OCS lease sales). These
mechanisms for state input were one of the
key aspects of the 1978 amendments intended
to coopt state dissatisfaction with the leasing
process.
How does this system work together
with information about environmental
consequences of OCS drilling? As we go
through the phases of OCS development, it
will become clear that scientific information
is supposed to drive the system, and the
MMS is supposed to make many of its
decisions based on this information. The
interesting part is what happens when
scientific information is inconclusive or non
existent.
Pre-Leasing
Section 18 of the OCSLA requires
the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a
program of proposed lease sales for a five-
year period. This is generally referred to as
the "five-year plan." Environmental
information is one of the key factors the
Secretary is required to consider in setting
the leasing schedule: Sections 18(a)(l) and
(2) require consideration of the
environmental and predictive information
available, other uses of OCS areas, and the
equitable sharing of benefits and risks of
development among the various OCS regions.
Section 18(a)(3) requires the Secretary, in
setting the timing and location of lease sales,
to attempt to "obtain a proper balance
between the potential for environmental
damage, the potential for the discovery of oil
and gas, and the potential for adverse impact
on the coastal zone."
This balancing has generated most of
the controversy under Section 18. The
coastal states, in playing their institutional
role of opposing OCS development, have a
real interest in seeing that particular areas
they view as inappropriate for development
are not included in the five-year plan. This
is because inclusion in the plan does not
necessarily mean an area will be leased, but
if an area is not included in the plan it
cannot be leased. This is obviously a good
thing from the perspective of the coastal
states because it permits them to stop
worrying about an area and move on to other
things.
One historical fact bears noting before
we look at the cases considering Section 18.
This provision has only been around since
1978, and consequently only three five-year
plans have been proposed. The first was
proposed by Secretary of the Interior Cecil
Andrus for 1980-85. The second, which was
essentially a revision of the Andrus plan, was
proposed by James Watt for 1982-87, and the
third was proposed by Donald Hodel for
1987-92. All of these plans, and particularly
the 1982-87 Watt plan, represented significant
expansions of the OCS leasing program and
consequently generated a lot of controversy.
The Watt program also introduced the very
controversial concept of "area leasing," under
which essentially the entire OCS was
proposed for leasing, and ultimate decisions
about what would be leased were made on
the basis of industry interest.
The challenge to the 1980-85 Andrus
program set the standards of review for
Section 18 decisions, and they are quite
lenient ones. (California v. Watt, 688 F.2d
1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). (The OCSLA
establishes, by the way, that review of a five-
year plan is by direct appeal to the District of
Columbia Circuit). The way the court got to
these standards of review is a little unusual.
Section 23(c) of the OCSLA actually
prescribes the standard of review to be
applied to secretarial findings with respect to
a five-year plan: "The findings of the
Secretary, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive." The D.C.
Circuit did not, however, follow literally this
apparently clear directive, and instead applied
different, less stringent standards of review to
certain key types of secretarial findings with
respect to five-year plans.
In California v. Watt, the court
acknowledged the language of Section 23(c),
but reasoned that the relationship between
Section 18 and Section 23(c) rendered the
literal application of the substantial evidence
standard of Section 23(c) inappropriate. The
court said this was because Section 18
basically leaves the devising of a leasing plan
to the Secretary's discretion, and directs that
the plan be developed through procedures
similar to informal administrative rule-making.
In addition, the court analogized the
function the Secretary of the Interior
performed in formulating the leasing program
to the function that the Secretary of
Commerce performs under the Occupational
Health and Safety Act of 1979: both involve
the determination of policy as well as the
adjudication of disputed facts. Policy
determinations are simply not susceptible to
the same kind of review as factual
determinations, said the court, because they
often involve areas in which there is no clear
evidence on which to draw factual
conclusions. Based on all this, Watt 1
summarizes the standards of review for the
Secretary's decisions in the Section 18 process
as follows:
When reviewing findings of
ascertainable fact made by the
Secretary, the substantial
evidence test guides our
inquiry. When reviewing the
policy judgments made by the
Secretary, including those
predictive and difficult calls
the Secretary is called upon to
make, we will subject them to
searching scrutiny to insure
that they are neither arbitrary
nor irrational - in other words,
we must determine 'whether
the decision is based on a
consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has
been a clear error in
judgment.'
We have already seen that much of
the scientific information about the
environmental consequences of OCS
development is uncertain or subject to
interpretation. Taken together with the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review
the D.C. Circuit has determined to apply to
decisions involving prediction, it will be
extremely difficult for a state to successfully
challenge a Secretarial decision to include an
area in the five-year plan.
This is especially so in light of a
second holding by the D.C. Circuit concerning
the balancing the Secretary must perform
under Section 18(a)(3). The court said the
Secretary is not required to treat all of the
factors to be balanced equally, because the
purpose of the OCSLA is "the expeditious
development of OCS resources:"
The environmental and coastal
considerations are undoubtedly
important, but the Act does
not require that they receive a
weight equal to that of
potential oil and gas discovery.
A balancing of factors is not
the same as treating all factors
equally....The Act does not
mandate any particular
balance, but vests the
Secretary with substantial
discretion to weigh the
elements so as to 'best meet
national energy needs.'
Given this, it seems unlikely that a court
could find a "clear error of judgment" in the
Secretary's decision to put an area in the
five-year plan. Two other decisions by the
D.C. Circuit considering various challenges to
the Watt and Hodel five-year plans have
confirmed these standards of review.
So we see that the state of
information about the environmental
consequences of OCS development interacts
with the statutory standards and judicial
interpretation to vest a great deal of
discretion in the Secretary at the five-year
plan stage. Is this necessarily a bad thing?
After all, including an OCS area in the five-
year plan is not the same as leasing it or
developing it. Let's reserve judgment on that
question until after we have looked at the
other phases of OCS development.
Leasing
Again, when Congress enacted the
1978 amendments to the OCSLA, one of its
purposes was to cut down on the litigation
and delays that had plagued OCS lease sales
since the Santa Barbara blowout by bringing
the coastal states into the process. One of
the primary avenues for doing this was
Section 19 of the OCSLA, which provides in
pertinent part as follows:
(a) Any Governor of any
affected state or the executive
of any affected local
government in such State may
submit recommendations to
the Secretary regarding Ihe
size, timing, or location of a
proposed lease sale or with
respect to a proposed
development and production
plan.
(c) The Secretary shall accept
recommendations of the
Governor and may accept
recommendations of the
executive of any affected local
government if he determines,
after having provided the
opportunity for consultation,
that they provide for a
reasonable balance between
the national interest and the
well-being of the citizens of
the affected State. For
purposes of this subsection, a
determination of the national
interest shall be based on the
desirability of obtaining oil and
gas supplies in a balanced
manner and the findings,
purposes and policies of this
subchapter.
This sounds to the good, so far as the coastal
states are concerned. It gives them a formal
voice in leasing decisions, and is mandatory in
terms: the Secretary shall accept
recommendations provided he finds a
reasonable balance between the national
interest and the well-being of the citizens of
the affected state. Section 19 also provides,
however, that the Secretary's decision on
Section 19 recommendations is subject only
to arbitrary and capricious review:
The Secretary's determination
that recommendations provide,
or do not provide, for a
reasonable balance between
the national interest and the
well-being of the citizens of
an affected state shall be final
and shall not, alone be a basis
for invalidation of a proposed
lease sale or a proposed
development and production
plan in any suit or judicial
review pursuant to section
1349 of this title, unless found
to be arbitrary or capricious.
In practice, this has meant that the
Secretary's decisions on Section 19
recommendations are more or less
unassailable. Tribal Village of Alaitan v.
Model, 869 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1988) is a
good example. In that case, the Secretary
balanced the net economic value of the
proposed lease sales against the probability
and impact of oil spills in making the Section
19 determination-quite a narrow set of
considerations given the numerous potential
impacts of OCS leasing. The Ninth Circuit
said this approach was permissible, and stated
"Alaska uncovers no fundamental flaw or
irrationality; rather, Alaska only succeeds in
showing it prefers the results reached by a
different methodology."
Again, we have seen that the scientific
information regarding environmental impacts
of OCS activities is often uncertain. The
Secretary is given wide discretion not only to
choose the information he will consider in the
Section 19 balancing, but also to draw
conclusions from that information. Taken
altogether, this means that the Secretary's
decisions will very seldom exhibit the kind of
"irrationality" needed for them to be
overturned under an arbitrary and capricious
standard of review.
Another aspect of the leasing process
deserves mention here. Like other federal
actions, OCS leasing activities are subject to
the National Environmental Policy Act, and
an environmental impact statement is
routinely prepared for lease sales. A number
of lease sales have been challenged on the
basis that the accompanying environmental
impact statements were too vague or were
incomplete. Many of these challenges have
been turned down on the basis that the
phased nature of OCS development excuses
the government from the need to consider
many potential impacts or perform extensive
analysis at the lease sale stage.
The courts have pointed to a number
of reasons to support the conclusion that
detailed environmental analysis need not be
performed at the lease sale stage. A key one
is the idea that leasing is a paper transaction,
giving the lessee no vested right to actually
go out and develop the leased area.
Consequently, additional analysis can be
performed if necessary when specific activities
are proposed. A second idea the courts have
often relied upon is that the MMS retains
the power under its regulations to modify or
disapprove altogether proposed activities, and
the states have the right, through the
consistency review process, to influence the
process at the exploration and development
stages. The same general sort of logic has
been used to reject claims under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). The courts
have on several occasions turned down
challenges to lease sales based on the ESA
based on the idea that leasing itself does not
put any species in danger, and that all
subsequent activities will be subject to the
ESA's restrictions.
There has been a good deal of
criticism of this kind of analysis recently: we
have seen that the National Research Council
has questioned whether there is a true
separation of leasing and development. Mr.
Van de Kamp also questions this reasoning.
The points he makes are generally valid: it is
fundamentally rather silly to think, as the
courts apparently do, that OCS lessees pay
millions of dollars for nothing more than a
"priority" to develop OCS reserves. It is also,
as a matter of common sense, naive to think
that the federal government will be
completely neutral in its administration of a
program that is its second largest source of
revenue. This is not to suggest that the
Department of the Interior or the MMS are
doing anything improper, but simply to make
the point that their job is to get the OCS
developed, and their view of environmental
matters is going to be colored by that fact.
These are good practical, if somewhat
difficult to prove empirically, reasons to
question whether the federal government will
take a hard look at environmental concerns
before permitting development of a leased
area to go forward. Equally important, the
provisions of the OCSLA and the CZMA
permit OCS development to be stopped only
if serious environmental harm is virtually
certain. The next section looks at these
provisions.
Exploration/Development and Production
When an OCS lessee gets ready to
actually go out and drill wells on the OCS, a
number of federal statutes come into play.
The critical ones for this discussion are the
OCSLA and the CZMA.
The OCSLA requires the offshore
operator to submit a document, known as a
plan of exploration, prior to drilling an
exploratory well, and a development and
production plan prior to drilling additional
wells for development of an oil and gas field.
These documents, which I will sometimes
refer to generically as "plans," outline the
elements of the proposed operations. They
are required to include information about
facilities, expected discharges of pollutants,
and expected impacts of the proposed
operations on the environment. In the
Western Gulf of Mexico, an abbreviated
version of the development and production
plan, known as a "development operations
coordination document," is required. The
plans are reviewed for adequacy by both the
MMS and the adjacent coastal state or states:
the MMS under the authority of the OCSLA,
and the states under the provisions of both
the OCSLA and the CZMA.
The MMS has the authority to require
modification of a plan if it is "inconsistent
with the provisions of the lease, the
[OCSLA], or the regulations prescribed under
the [OCSLA]...." The MMS has authority to
reject an exploration plan, however, only if it
meets some fairly stiff criteria:
...a proposed activity would
probably cause serious harm
or damage to life (including
fish or other aquatic life)...or
the marine, coastal, or human
environment, and that the
proposed activity cannot be
modified to avoid the
condition(s).
The criteria for rejection of a development
and production plan are even stiffen
Exceptional geological
conditions in the lease area,
exceptional resource value in
the marine or coastal
environmental, or other
exceptional circumstances exist,
and all of the following:
(A) Implementation of the
plan would probably cause
serious harm or damage to life
(including fish or other aquatic
life)...or to the marine, coastal
or human environments.
(B) The threat or harm or
damage will not disappear or
decrease to an acceptable
extent within a reasonable
period of time.
(C) The advantages of
disapproving the plan outweigh
the advantages of development
and production.
This is almost word-for-word the same test
that is used to determine whether an OCS
lease may be cancelled out of environmental
concerns.
Now, these tests require, in addition
to their other conditions, that the OCS
activities in question probably cause serious
harm to the environment. Looking back at
the uncertainties surrounding OCS
development impacts, it is clear that it would
be a rare situation when these tests could be
met. The National Research Council and
Mr. Van de Kamp both point to the fact that
the MMS has never rejected a development
plan or cancelled a lease for environmental
reasons as proof of the fact that the decision
to lease is a de facto decision to produce and
develop. I would suggest that given the
terms of the OCSLA and the state of
knowledge about the effects of OCS
development, it is no wonder that this is the
case. It would be difficult to find a situation
in which a discrete OCS well or even series
of wells, with their low risk of oil spills and
speculative risk from discharges of cuttings,
produced waters and the like would probably
cause serious harm to the environment. So
we see that review by the MMS is extremely
unlikely to result in cancellation of an OCS
lease or rejection of an exploration or
development and production plan.
What about the review power granted
the states under the OCSLA and the CZMA?
The OCSLA permits the states to comment
on exploration plans, but does not say
anything about the kind of deference the
MMS must give to these comments. Section
19 of the OCSLA applies to development and
production plans as well as leasing decisions,
and consequently requires consideration of
state recommendations, but as we have seen,
the standard of review for the Secretary's
decisions on Section 19 recommendations is
quite lenient. This leaves consistency review
power.
The federal courts, including the
Supreme Court in Secretary of the Interior \>.
California, have tended to treat the
consistency review power as a sort of "veto"
over OCS development, subject to appeal to
the Secretary of Commerce as provided in
the CZMA. A look at the Secretary of
Commerce's decisions in OCS-related appeals
from a refusal to concur in a consistency
certification suggests that this power is a
strong one, but is something less than a veto.
It further suggests that the Secretary of
Commerce, in deciding consistency appeals,
has developed standards of review that again
place the "burden of uncertainty" on the
coastal states.
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The CZMA provides that a non-
concurrence can be overturned "[if] the
Secretary [of Commerce], on his own
initiative or upon appeal by the applicant,
finds, after providing a reasonable opportunity
for detailed comments from the Federal
agency involved and from the state, that the
activity is consistent with the objectives of this
chapter or is otherwise necessary in the
interest of national security." The regulations
implementing the CZMA expand the term
"consistent with the objectives of this chapter"
into a four-part test:
(a) The activity furthers one
or more of the competing
national objectives or purposes
contained in Section 302 or
303 of the Act;
(b) When performed
separately or when its
cumulative effects are
considered, it will not cause
adverse effects on the
resources of the coastal zone
substantial enough to outweigh
its contribution to the national
interest;
(c) The activity will not
violate any requirements of
the Clean Air Act, as
amended, or the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act,
as amended, and
(d) There is no reasonable
alternative available (e.g.
location, design, etc.) which
would permit the activity to be
conducted in a manner
consistent with the
management program.
As of the end of 1989, nine appeals
from state refusals to concur in consistency
determinations have resulted in written
opinions from the Secretary of Commerce.
Four of those opinions have involved OCS
plans, and two more appeals involving OCS
plans are presently pending before the
Secretary. This relatively small sample of
opinions gives a pretty clear idea of the kind
of reasoning the Secretary of Commerce will
use in applying this four-part test in
consistency appeals.
First of all, the first and third
elements of this test are ciphers. The
Secretary has found that OCS development
is itself a purpose of the CZMA, and that
OCS development exploration and
development plans are always required to
comply with the Clean Water Act and the
Clean Air Act. The fourth element, whether
alternatives are available, is important, but
does not furnish a means of stopping an OCS
project altogether. The real heart of this test
is the second element: balancing adverse
effects on the coastal zone against the
national interest.
In considering this element, the
Secretary of Commerce has looked at the
individual and cumulative effects of routine
conduct of the proposed activities, and at the
individual and cumulative risk of "unplanned
events," or oil spills. Since the available
studies do not establish any chronic effects
from drilling fluids and other routine
discharges, the Secretary has uniformly found
that the individual and cumulative impact of
routine conduct is minimal.
With respect to oil spills, the
Secretary has routinely focused on the low
risk of a spill occurring, and given little
weight to the possibility of a spill. More
troubling, in considering the cumulative risk
of oil spills from the proposed activity and
other activities in the area, the Secretary
seems to focus on the amount by which the
specific project under consideration will add
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to the cumulative risk of a spill. For
example, in the Secretary's most recent
opinion involving a Texaco project in the
Santa Barbara Channel offshore California,
the Secretary acknowledged that the
environmental impact statement for the area
in question showed a virtual certainty of a
major spill occurring from development in the
Santa Barbara area. But, said the Secretary,
"Texaco's proposed project will not add
significantly to the cumulative adverse effects
on coastal zone resources." There seems to
be no place in this analysis where cumulative
effects can really make a difference in the
outcome.
To determine the "national interest"
against which the potential adverse effects
must be balanced, the Secretary consults with
various government agencies, who typically
respond with predictable, and in many
respects, valid comments on the importance
of national energy security, creating jobs, and
the like. As might be expected, these readily
outweigh the minimal adverse effects on the
coastal zone which the analysis discussed
above identifies.
This is not intended to suggest that
consistency review is worthless in the OCS
context. It is worth quite a lot. California
in particular has used this power to require
OCS operators to install additional oil spill
protection equipment, use specific sorts of
drilling muds, and the like. It does appear,
however, that the way the Secretary of
Commerce goes about analyzing OCS projects
will not permit the coastal states to outright
stop an OCS development project absent
extremely unusual circumstances. In effect,
the burden of proof is again on the coastal
states or other parties opposing OCS
development to show that the development
will cause serious environmental harm and,
given the present state of information about
the effects of OCS development, that cannot
be done.
Conclusions
Now, let's retrace our steps a bit and
think about how these different ideas work
together. In the early stages of the process,
leasing and pre-leasing, the government is
afforded discretion in its decision whether to
put an OCS area up for development. The
burden is on the coastal states to show that
the Secretary is wrong, and if information is
inconclusive or non-existent, that simply can't
be done. Thus, virtually any area having
some hydrocarbon potential can make it
through the pre-leasing and leasing stages.
In the latter stages of the process, the
regulations permit cancellation of a lease or
rejection of a plan only if the activity will
probably cause serious harm to the
environment. Given the present state of
knowledge, that situation may never arise.
The states can attempt to block particular
projects through the consistency review
process, but the sort of analysis used by the
Secretary of Commerce in consistency
appeals, again along with the present state of
information about environmental effects of
OCS drilling, means that such an attempt
won't likely be successful.
These conclusions have several
implications for the idea that leasing is more
or less a paper transaction, and so NEPA
compliance for lease sales can be subjected to
less than exacting scrutiny. It means that the
decision to lease is, in essence, a decision to
go ahead with exploration and possibly
development. It also means that the federal
government has less incentive to do what the
courts have assumed they will do--obtain
better environmental information in the latter
stages of the exploration and development
process—since, as things now stand, a lack of
information or inconclusive information will
not stop development.
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Is it necessarily a bad thing that the
burden of uncertainty is on the states and
other opposing OCS development? After all,
just as we do not need perfect information to
go forward with OCS development, so we do
not need perfect assurance that no
environmental harm whatsoever will result.
In addition, the policies to be served by OCS
oil and gas development, such as energy
security and providing employment, are
undoubtedly important. Yet for the reasons
I stated at the beginning of this piece, I think
putting the entire burden of uncertainty on
the states is a bad idea.
As a policy matter, we do not need
perfect information to make decisions about
OCS leasing, exploration and development,
but we do need adequate information. The
National Research Council tells us that
information in some areas—how ecosystems
work, and chronic and sublethal effects of
development, for example-is not adequate.
Yet the system as it now exists would permit
development to go forward in those areas.
As a purely practical matter, if we
accept the idea that the states are, in many
cases, less willing to tolerate uncertainty
about the environmental effects of OCS
development, then it is easy to see how this
process has helped send the states to the
political forum. Looking at the process, there
appears to be no point at which the states'
environmental concerns are entitled to any
particular deference. This is what Mr. Van
de Kamp says in his recent article, and I
generally agree with his conclusions, if not all
of his reasoning. Mr. Van de Kamp lays the
blame on the courts, which have admittedly
given a great deal of deference to the
Secretary of the Interior's decision, but I
believe the language of the OCSLA and its
regulations, along with a lack of information,
are as much to blame. In any case, what's to
be done?
First, the federal government needs
to face up to the fact that the entire OCS is
not the Gulf of Mexico, and the coastal
states, with respect to routine conduct of oil
and gas operations, want assurance that there
will be no serious environmental damage, not
just assurance that there is no evidence that
such damage will occur. This means
performing the studies necessary to generate
consensus. This in turn means paying more
attention to studies in the Gulf of Mexico,
which in the past has been something of a
stepchild in the OCS study process. It may
be that this is what the Bush Administration
proposes to do in its new OCS leasing
program.
Second, the federal government should
recognize that there are areas, the Florida
Keys being a good example, that local
residents (and often others) feel so strongly
about that they will not countenance even the
most minimal risk of a catastrophic
environmental event such as an oil spill. In
other words, there are some areas in which
the unavoidable uncertainties of OCS
development simply are not acceptable. The
Bush Administration also seems to be moving
toward this view.
Third, in areas in which development
can occur, the government may need to
rethink its way of doing business. If the real
purpose of OCS development is to increase
domestic energy production and national
energy security, and not just to bring more
money into federal coffers, then the
government could give up a share of its
royalties and bonuses to afford greater
environmental protection, but still keep
offshore drilling financially attractive to oil
companies.
One example would be to give up a
portion of its lease bonus in exchange for a
guarantee of on-site, state-of-the-art oil spill
containment and cleanup equipment during
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exploratory drilling, and the barging of drilling
muds to onshore disposal facilities. Another
way might be to accept a slightly lesser
royalty, but require additional safeguards
during production, such as reinjection rather
than ocean disposal of all produced waters.
Another suggestion, which again the Bush
Administration is considering, would be to
give the adjacent coastal states a more
significant share of OCS revenues than the
small amount they receive now. This would
not be a bribe, as some politicians have
recently suggested, but is necessary to permit
the states to maintain the infrastructure and
technical staff necessary to properly deal with
OCS development. It would also permit the
states to more readily fund their own research
into the effects of OCS development.
All of these suggestions, with the
exception of revenue sharing, could be
implemented with regulatory rather than
statutory changes. Statutory changes may be
required, however, if coastal communities are
to have any real faith in the process. Either
way, a real change in attitude by the federal
government is necessary to get the OCS
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